Increased instability of the family, more heterogeneity among individuals, greater international mobility of labor and capital, and ambitions to encourage individual responsibility also have important implications for pension systems.
When discussing these issues, it is useful to set up a more elaborate classification of pension systems than the usual distinction between defined-benefit (DB) and definedcontribution (DC) systems. The choice of an appropriate taxonomy depends, of course, on the issues to be raised. One question that is focused on in this paper concerns the consequences of socioeconomic shocks on the distribution of income and the sharing of income risk among generations. It turns out that the distinction between pension systems with exogenous and endogenous contribution rates (tax rates) then becomes crucial. But the paper also deals with socioeconomic changes that are induced by the pension system itself via behavioral adjustments of individuals -and the feedback of these changes on the pension system. When dealing with such adjustments, highly relevant features of pension systems are the degree to which they are actuarial and funded, respectively -two aspects that are related but not the identical.
1 * I am grateful for comments on a draft of the paper from Martin Feldstein, Laurence Kotlikoff, Dennis
Snower and Kjetil Storesletten. 1 Pension systems with exogenous contribution rates could possibly be called DC systems, and systems with exogenous benefit rules DB systems. But such a terminology would be quite different from that used in the literature. There, a DC system is usually identified as an actuarially fair, fully funded system with individual accounts, while a DB system is identified as a system where pensions are tied to previous earnings (with lump-sum pensions regarded as a special case). See, for instance, Diamond (2000) and Thomson (1998) .
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Six generic pension systems are classified in Section I, highlighting the distinctions mentioned above. The contribution rate is exogenous in two of these systems, while it is endogenous in the other four systems. Each of the six pension systems can be varied considerably, both by incorporating elements from other systems and by introducing restrictions on contributions or benefits. Section II turns to the consequences of socioeconomic changes for the distribution of income and macroeconomic balance, while sections III and IV examine alternative pension reforms aimed at mitigating some of these consequence. A few of these reforms are "marginal" in the sense that certain rules of a pension system are modified, including both ad hoc policy measures and the introduction of various automatic adjustment mechanisms. Other reforms are "radical" since they imply shifts to different types of pension systems. Section V concludes.
As always when designing social insurance systems, it is necessary to strike a balance between conflicting considerations, such as distribution, risk sharing and incentives.
But it is also important to be concerned with the balance between paternalism and individual freedom of choice (and hence individual responsibility). This also raises the more general question of the appropriate role of government in society as a whole, including the control of capital markets and government intervention in the management of firms.
I. Classification of pension systems
I distinguish the six pension systems using the following notation: = rate of growth factor for labor income (tax base) i = real interest rate on financial markets I = 1 + i = real interest-rate factor w j = real wage rate of individual j h j = hours of work of individual j.
3 I assume two overlapping generations, each living for two periods. For some purposes, however, it is important to divide each of these periods into several sub-periods ("years"). The schematic description below of revenues and expenditures of various pension systems should be self-explanatory. The revenues of the pension systems are denoted below the horizontal lines, the expenditures above the lines.
A. Exogenous contribution rate
(1) Fixed-fee system
In this pension system, there is a fixed contribution rateτ t . Aggregate pension benefits in period t are determined by the revenues of the system in the same period, τ t t t y N .
Hence, the budget is balanced by definition. The (endogenous) pension benefit to an individual and the (endogenous) implicit return on previously paid contributions by the individual depend on the number of contemporary workers N t , their individual earnings y t , and the number of retirees R t .
(t-1) (t) (t+1)
Implicit return factor:
(2) Actuarially fair, fully funded system
As in the fixed-fee system, the contribution rate τ is exogenous and the pension benefit is endogenous. The return on the individual's forced saving is equal to the return in capital markets i on prefunded assets. There is intertemporal budget balance for each cohort.
As is well known, a compulsory fully funded pension system will have an influence on the consumption of the individual only if he is liquidity constrained or unwilling to borrow, and hence unable to offset government-induced reallocations of his cash flow over the life cycle.
B. Endogenous contribution rate (3) Lump-sum benefit system
This pension system provides the individual with an exogenously given basic pension, while the contribution rate τ is endogenously determined to ensure balance in the budget of the pension system.
Implicit return factor 2 : B y t
B y t −1 is the "replacement rate", which is inversely proportional to the individual's previous income.
2 The return is the same as in the fixed-fee system, eq. (2), if the benefit is the same
where B y t = the " intergenerational income ratio" and R N t t the "dependency ratio".
(4) Earnings-based system
In this system, the pension of an individual is determined as a fixed fraction (replacement rate) α of his previous earnings. The pension in this system is a fixed fraction, γ , of contributions previously paid by the individual. 
Endogenousτ γτ 
(6) Fixed intergenerational income-ratio system
In this system, the pension of an individual is a fixed fraction, µ , of the average earnings of contemporary workers.
Thus, in a fixed-fee system the (endogenous) pension of the individual is unchanged if the number of pensioners (R t ) increases at the same rate as aggregate earnings of workers (y t N t ); see eq.
(1). The same condition guarantees that the (endogenous) contribution rate is constant in lump-sum benefit, earnings-based, and contributionbased systems; see eqs. (4), (6) and (8). In a fixed intergenerational income-ratio system, the (endogenous) contribution rate is constant if the number of retirees changes at the same rate as the number of workers, see eq. (10). In actuarially fair systems, neither the contribution rate nor the pension benefit is directly related to the number of pensioners or aggregate earnings of workers.
To highlight the incentive structure in different pension systems, it is useful to write aggregate contributions as τ τ , there is no effect whatsoever on the individual's own pension.
The distinction between an earnings-based system and a contribution-based system is not brought out in the two-period framework above. In general, the benefit received in earnings-based systems is tied to the individual's previous earnings rather than to his earlier contributions as in contribution-based systems. To highlight this distinction, we have to partition the period of work into a number of subperiods, such as years, and let the tax rate vary between these subperiods. Only in the special case where the pension benefit is tied to the lifetime earnings of the individual, and the contribution rate W is constant over time, will contribution-based and earnings-based systems coincide.
II. Effects of socioeconomic changes
Let us begin by looking at the effects of four types of socioeconomic change on the distribution of income between pensioners and workers, and hence the risk-sharing properties of different pension systems: (1) a reduction in the number of workers (N t );
(2) lower average labor income (y t ) or a slower rate of increase in labor income (y t /y t-1 ); (3) a greater number of retired individuals (R t ); and (4) lower interest rates (i).
I start with the "direct impact" on the income of workers and pensioners. By that term I mean the ceteris paribus effect of a change in one socioeconomic variable, with given rules concerning benefits and fees, and with constant values for the other variables. Since the paper is not based on a formal general equilibrium model, indirect effects, for instance on asset prices, are treated heuristically. In all of the other pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems mentioned above, workers have to bear the entire (direct) burden of adjustment since fewer workers have to finance the same (fixed or predetermined) aggregate pension payments as before. Neglecting conceivable consequences for aggregate employment (i.e., assuming the income and substitution effects on labor supply approximately cancel), τ t has to be raised in proportion to the fall in the number of active individuals in order to balance the pension budget; see eqs. (4), (6), (8) and (10). 5 Workers' aggregate consumption tends to decrease as a result of both the fall in the number of workers and the reduction in after-tax income of each individual worker. Thus, if aggregate output happens to decline in proportion to the reduction in the number of workers, then aggregate demand is likely to fall more than aggregate supply. If so, there will be macroeconomic scope for reduced taxes and/or increased government spending. Clearly, there is no (direct) risk sharing in any of the PAYGO systems listed above in response to a fall in the number of workers.
The consequences for various pension systems are about the same if employment falls as a result of increased structural unemployment. In this case, however, the government would be in a worse financial position due to higher expenditures for unemployment benefits. It is also worth noting that a rise in unemployment may to some extent be caused by the pension system itself because payroll taxes tend to raise labor costs for workers that are exposed to minimum wages (via legislation or collective bargaining).
In the context of an actuarially fair (fully funded) pension system, by contrast, the income of both individual pensioners and individual workers will be unaffected. Thus, after a fall in N t , both have sufficient income to continue consuming as much as before -as long as indirect effects are neglected. But there may be indirect effects.
When pensioners start unloading financial assets, there are fewer potential buyers of these assets (than before) due to the fall in the cohort size of workers. As a result, asset prices would fall and interest rates rise -except in the special case of a small open economy with capital markets that are completely integrated internationally.
actuarially fair, funded pension system. If so, there would be domestic excess demand for goods and services, with increased inflation or deterioration of the current account of the balance of payments, or both. If pensions are not fully indexed to inflation, which they usually are not in fully funded systems, retirees will have to accept further downward adjustment of their per capita consumption. Pensioners may also be harmed by government attempts to combat the current account deficit with policy measures designed to reduce domestic aggregate demand.
Determining the proportion of the reduction in consumption of workers and pensioners would require a quantitative general equilibrium model, which is outside the scope of this paper. In any event, the main point here is that even under an actuarially fair pension system, pensions may not be fully protected against the consequences of a drop in the number of workers -due to the eventuality of falling asset prices, a deterioration in the current account of the balance of payments and (without price indexation of assets) higher inflation. 
B. Reduced average labor income
The slowdown in the rate of growth of average labor income (a fall in y t /y t-1 ) since the early 1970s is another factor underlying today's concern about pension systems. This development might not be entirely regarded as an exogenous shock from the point of view of the pension system. To some extent, the slowdown has been induced by labor distortions due to marginal tax wedges associated with payroll taxes -resulting in negative substitution effects on both hours of work h j and real wages w j (the latter because of disincentives on investment in human capital and work intensity).
In the context of a PAYGO pension system, the direct distributional effects are rather similar to the case of a fall in the number of workers; y and N enter in the same way in most PAYGO systems. One important difference, though, is that individual workers are now directly exposed to reduced earnings. This holds regardless of whether the fall in earnings is the result of lower wages, w j , or shorter hours of work, h j (for instance, via "work sharing").
7 Such mechanisms are discussed in Barr (1999) .
11
Moreover, both a fixed-fee system and a fixed intergenerational income-ratio system incorporate (automatic) risk-sharing devices between workers and pensioners in the case of fluctuations in wages and hours of work, as opposed to the earlier discussed case of fluctuations in the number of workers. In fixed-fee systems, a fall in workers' average disposable income by ∆y (1-τ t ) is accompanied by a fall in the average pension by τ t . ∆y(N t /R t ). Thus, income risk is shared between pensioners and workers in
In the case of a fixed intertemporal income-ratio system, a fall in average labor income is shared between representative agents in the two groups in the proportion µ. The consequences for macroeconomic balance are quite complex and depend partly on whether the fall in the real wage is related to a drop in productivity and hence output, and/or to a redistribution of income between labor and capital.
Again, the consequences are more complicated in an actuarially fair system. Since there is no direct impact on pensioners, individual workers have to bear the entire direct burden of a fall in real wages. Meanwhile, the reduction in wage rates implies that workers have fewer resources available to buy unloaded assets from pensioners. 
C. Increased number of pensioners
Recent and predicted future increases in the number of retirees is a third important factor behind today's concern about pension systems. The consequences depend on how this change comes about -for instance, via immigration of elderly people, the aging of a particularly large cohort ("baby boomers"), early retirement, or higher longevity after retirement.
In the first case -immigration of elderly individuals -the crucial issue is how immigrants are treated relative to native-born citizens. 8 Suppose instead that the number of retired individuals increases as the result of aging of a particularly large cohort, which may be described as a parallel increase in N t-1 and R t with N t unchanged. In fixed-fee systems, per capita pensions will fall in proportion to the rise in R t , (eq. (1)), while contribution rates would have to be raised in the same proportion in lump-sum benefit, earning-based, contribution-based and fixed intergenerational income-ratio systems (eqs. (4), (6), (8)). Again, there is no automatic risk-sharing mechanism.
Assuming no differences in marginal propensities to consume, problems of macroeconomic balance would not be induced (except for conceivable labor supply effects of higher marginal tax rates).
If a rise in the number of pensioners is instead caused by an increase in the frequency of early retirement, the outcome would be a simultaneous rise in R t and a fall in N t . In reality, this type of change is often induced by the incentive structure of the pension system itself. In the context of a fixed-fee system, pensions would have to be reduced in proportion to the fall in the ratio N t /R t , while in lump-sum benefit, earnings-based, contribution-based and fixed intergenerational income-ratio systems, the tax rate would have to be raised in proportion to the rise in the ratio R t /N t .
8 If they are treated in the same way, immigrants would be entitled to a domestic pension under three of the generic pension schemes listed: fixed-fee, lump-sum benefit and fixed intergenerational incomeratio systems. In fixed-fee systems, "domestic" pensioners would have to accept a fall in their per capita pension by the factor N R t t −1 / , while in lump-sum benefit and fixed intertemporal incomeratio pension systems, payroll taxes would have to be raised by that factor. Thus, there are no automatic mechanisms for risk sharing between workers and pensioners in any of these systems when the number of pensioners increases via immigration of elderly people. Problems of macroeconomic balance will not arise as long as the marginal propensity to consume is the same for all groups concerned. Income flows in the context of other pension systems -earnings-based, contribution-based and actuarially fair systems -would be unaffected. Under these three systems, elderly immigrants will (in the real world) be financed by relatives or by social welfare payments. The latter, of course, would require a general tax increase.
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In the context of an actuarially fair pension system, there will be no direct impact on the income flows. But when a large number of pensioners sell assets to workers, the former may face falling asset prices in the same way as in the case of a reduced number of workers. This would imply that pensioners will be hit indirectly in fully funded systems as well -except with fully rational expectations or in a small open economy with fully internationalized capital markets.
The situation becomes more complicated if the number of pensioners instead increases because of greater longevity after retirement, so that R t increases relative to both N t −1 and N t . In fixed-fee systems, pensioners would have to accept a reduction in yearly pensions in proportion to higher longevity. More precisely, there will be a reduction in yearly pensions by the change in the factor N R t t −1 / . By contrast, under lump-sum benefit, earnings-based, contribution-based and fixed intergenerational income-ratio systems, τ t would have to be raised in proportion to the increase in the ratio R t /N t , provided each pensioner is guaranteed the same annual pension as before.
Again, there is no risk sharing between generations.
In principle, the situation is the same in the case of an actuarially fair system as in a fixed-fee system, if information about longevity is obtained exactly when a fixed annuity is determined (at the time of retirement); the annuity has to be reduced in proportion to greater longevity. However, if such information is not obtained until after the annuity has been determined, the pension provider has to cover the higher costs, while the annual income of pensioners is unchanged. But in reality, information about higher (expected) longevity is usually available before retirement, indeed, during the course of working life. The insurance provider is then able to propose higher contributions, and workers are likely to accept such proposals. It has been argued that similar adjustments are difficult to achieve under PAYGO systems, because the link between what an individual pays and what he receives later on is usually rather weak. Since the fee in such a system functions as a tax wedge, higher fees may also be resisted by those who are anxious to avid additional work distortions (Persson, 1998 ).
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D. Lower real interest rates
The rise in real interest rates in recent decades, as compared to the 1950s and 1960s, is an important factor behind the increased popularity of actuarially fair, fully funded systems. Of course, we have no idea whether the average level of real interest rates will be even higher in the future, or if they will decline again. Since I have already discussed shocks that create problems for PAYGO systems, I now examine an interest shock that creates problems for actuarially fair, fully funded systems, i.e., a fall in real interest rates. A fall that takes place after retirement will either create financial difficulties for the pension provider (if the annuity is fixed) or force retirees to accept lower pensions (if the annuity is variable in the sense that it is gradually adjusted to realized asset returns also after retirement). In the first case, pension providers may try to shift the onto subsequent cohorts of pensioners.
At the level of an individual pensioner, an obvious difference between a fixed and a variable annuity is that in the latter case he has to accept higher income risk during the period of retirement. The reason, of course, is that with a variable annuity, withdrawal of accumulated pension capital takes place only gradually during the retirement period. The advantage to the individual is that he then has a further opportunity to enjoy the return on assets, such as shares, after having retired. A variable annuity also fulfills the role of reducing fluctuations in the relation (ratio) between replacement rates for consecutive cohorts of pensioners. The reason here is that the capital value of the annuity will not depend so much on the situation that happens to prevail on financial markets at the time of retirement. This gives rise to a genuine trade-off problem.
While a fixed annuity provides greater income insurance in connection with uncertainty about longevity, a variable annuity furnishes relative income insurance in connection with uncertainty about asset prices at the time of retirement. The individual may alternatively opt for "revolving" annuitization for a number of years before retirement, or a gradual shift (also before retirement) to less risky assets. But this means that the individual would miss out on the opportunity to enjoy the return on high-yielding assets after retirement in terms of accumulated pension capital.
So far I have only considered changes in real interest rates at or after retirement. If real interest rates have already fallen during the individual's working life, and are 15 expected to remain low for quite a while, he would probably agree to pay higher yearly contributions to a fully funded system in order to boost his future pension.
Even though there are no direct effects (as long as there are no buffer funds), PAYGO pension systems are not immune to changes in real interest rates. Both contribution rates and pension benefits may be influenced indirectly. The most obvious effect is that lower (higher) real interest rates would increase (reduce) real wage rates via a boost (retardation) of real investment.
III. Marginal reforms A. Ad hoc adjustment
Under all of the generic pension systems discussed above, well-specified rules guarantee budget balance via adjustments in either fees or pensions. In reality, such adjustments often require explicit political decisions. This process may take considerable time, partly in order to resolve conflicts about the distribution of income. In the meantime, financial imbalances of the pension system easily emerge. The combination of financial imbalances and unexpected redistributions of income are likely to initiate demand for ad hoc changes in contributions and/or benefits. For example, after a fall in the number of workers or in real wages, workers may resist higher fees in lump-sum benefit, earnings-based and contribution-based systems (and in fixed intergenerational income-ratio systems after the number of workers has declined).
Indeed, doubts are often expressed in the political debate as to whether workers will grant promised pension entitlements to the elderly after such disturbances. It is therefore tempting to speculate that workers may want to force contemporary pensioners to share the burden of adjustment in such cases. If ad hoc changes in nominal pension benefits are not politically feasible, obvious alternatives are higher taxes on pension income or partial punctuation of price indexation of pensions.
Since pensioners constitute only a minority among voters, it is perhaps less likely that workers could be forced to share the burden of adjustment when this largely tends to fall on pensioners. (This occurs, for example, in the case of a fall in the number of workers in fixed-fee systems and in the case of a fall in real interest rates in actuarial-16 ly fair systems, except if a fixed annuity has been set.) Policy actions for this purpose may be released, however, if pensioners are an important swing group in the political arena, and their voting behavior is particularly sensitive to the economic benefits offered.
Even though the benefits of contemporary pensioners have recently been cut to a considerable extent in some countries, and fees have been raised for workers, empirical evidence suggests that political authorities have mainly opted for a "third alternative": cuts in pensions for future pensioners (McHale, 1999). As an explanation, John
McHale has hypothesized that today's workers are afraid of becoming exposed to even greater cuts in their own pensions in the future unless they agree to some cuts.
But another explanation could be that the political price is higher if the government cuts current disposable income by means of higher fees or lower pensions today, than if it decides to reduce pensions far ahead into the future. After all, myopic behavior is not unheard of; indeed, reference to such behavior (often interpreted as time inconsistency) is one of the most common arguments for having compulsory pension systems in the first place.
When a pension system encounters problems because of a fall in the number of individuals of working age relative to the number of individuals above retirement age, immigration of young workers may be a solution. This presupposes, of course, that such immigration is not expected to result in serious tensions and conflicts in society.
B. Automatic adjustment mechanisms
The introduction of new types of automatic adjustment mechanisms within existing pension systems is an alternative to ad hoc policy interventions for dealing with socioeconomic shocks. One way of achieving this is to index pensions, more or less closely, to average wages of contemporary workers. This can be done by using the average wage each year as an accumulation factor for the pension claims that are acquired during working life, and/or by indexing annual pensions (after retirement) to the average wages of contemporary workers. A more explicit method consists of shifting to a "fixed intertemporal income-ratio" system (system no. 6 in the classification above). Such a reform would mean giving up ambitions to maintain strong quasiactuarial elements in the pension system, such as in systems no. 5. But it would still 17 be possible to make relative pensions among individual pensioners proportional to each individual's accumulated earnings or contributions; thus, some relative quasiactuarial element could still be achieved.
Under lump-sum benefit, earnings-based and contribution-based systems, there may also be resistance among wage earners for having to bear the entire burden of adjustment to a rise in longevity after retirement. A technically simple way of doing this would be to make annual pensions a declining function of remaining life expectancy after retirement. For example, under the new pension system in Sweden, when annual pensions are decided at the time of retirement, the pension benefit will be inversely proportional to expected longevity after retirement. In this special case, the entire burden of adjustment will be borne by the retirees -hardly a risk-sharing device. Peter
Diamond (2000) has questioned the wisdom of this element in the Swedish pension reform. Of course, risk sharing could be achieved by establishing a rule according to which workers and pensioners share the financial consequences (in a certain proportion) of increased longevity.
A more crude way of making a pension system financially viable, regardless of the type of disturbance, would be automatic reductions in benefits and/or automatic increases in fees in response to an emerging or anticipated deficit in the pension budget.
A higher retirement age -the ordinary age as well as the lowest early retirement ageis a particularly natural response if the health of individuals above today's retirement age is expected to improve. (It may then be important to implement stricter rules for disability and unemployment insurance, since these systems in fact provide alternative routes to early retirement). 9 However, a large fraction of the elderly would risk winding up in unemployment if the retirement age were increased considerably, mainly because of rigid wage and seniority wage scales. To avoid this, it would be necessary to accept increased downward flexibility of relative wages for the elderly, e.g. by ensuring that age-wage profiles are less steep, as well as by facilitating individual 9 There are limits, of course, to what can be achieved by such a reform. Given current fees and benefit rules, the OECD has calculated that the statutory retirement age would have to be raised, within a few 18 choice of hours of work. Some downward adjustment of wages of younger workers might also be necessary to prevent a higher retirement age from resulting in a temporary rise in youth unemployment. In most countries, union and government wage policies are obstacles to such solutions.
Since both health and preferences for work vary considerably among the elderly, there is, no doubt, a strong case for a flexible retirement age. But to avoid distorting work incentives, and to keep pension systems financially viable, there is also a strong case for combining such flexibility with actuarially fair adjustments of pensions under conditions of early retirement. Elderly individuals with health problems could then be referred to the sick insurance system. It is curious that today's pension systems and labor market arrangements are designed in ways that appear to turn higher longevity and better health among the elderly into serious social problems, rather than a blessing. This design is hardly an example of good "social engineering".
C. Shifting to a quasi-actuarial system (NDC system)
Lump-sum benefit systems and earnings-based systems have served as the most com- benefit) pension system may be removed by a shift from a non-actuarial to a quasiactuarial, contribution-based pension system.
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It is virtually impossible, however, to create a fully actuarially fair PAYGO system in a dynamically efficient economy, i.e., an economy in which the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate. The obvious reason is that PAYGO pension systems, which pay a higher return than the growth rate of the tax base, would wind up with an ever rising deficit. In other words, an actuarially fair PAYGO pension system is not financially stable, and hence not financially viable, in a dynamically efficient economy. In a dynamically inefficient economy, by contrast, it can be shown that an actuarially fair PAYGO system would automatically accumulate a fund of the same size as in a fully funded system (Hassler and Lindbeck, 1999) . But then there is no point in choosing an actuarially fair system since the return on paid contributions would be higher in a traditional PAYGO system.
But is it possible, or even desirable to make a PAYGO system actuarially fair just on the margin, while maintaining budget balance by setting the average return equal to the growth rate of the economy? Intuition suggests that efficiency would be improved if the marginal return on pensions were set in such a way that the individual in the case of marginal decisions is indifferent between paying pension fees and investing on the capital market. The point would be that many economic distortions are associated with marginal rather than average tax wedges. It turns out to be technically possible to create such a system (Hassler and Lindbeck, 1997) Owing to intragenerational distributional considerations, however, such a system is politically difficult to implement, since it requires a lump-sum tax (a "poll tax") in order to balance the pension budget.
Moreover, for a given tax rate, τ, it can be shown that the welfare gain of the inviable. See Thomson (1998) , p. 48, fn. 10) and OECD (1988) . 10 Assume that an individual starts working at the age of 20, retires at 64 and lives for another twenty years thereafter. As an approximation, the individual may be said to have paid contributions for 32 years. Let the contribution rate (τ) be 20 percent, so that if an individual earns $500 more (due to more hours of work or higher work intensity) he pays $100 as pension contributions. In a quasi-actuarial PAYGO system in which the return is 2 percent (the growth of the tax base), this contribution will be worth $188 after 32 years. If the real rate of return in financial markets is 5 percent and this is used as a discount rate, the capital value of these $188 at average working age is $40 (188/(1.05) 32 ). This means that the marginal tax wedge on work is 12 per cent (100-40)/500). Thus, a shift from a completely nonactuarial to a quasi-actuarial system will reduce the tax wedge from 20 percent to 12 percent in this case. The marginal tax wedge would be zero if the forced pension saving had instead been invested in a fund earning 5 percent per year (assuming that the funded system is started from scratch). creased efficiency of work would wind up entirely with the older generation. If the objective is to let all generations enjoy a welfare gain, the pension fee may be reduced, however (Hassler and Lindbeck, 1997).
IV. Radical reforms A. Shifting to an actuarially fair, fully funded system
What then are the gains of shifting from a PAYGO to an actuarially fair, fully funded system? This depends crucially on how the claims of the old PAYGO-pensioners are met during a period of transition. If PAYGO pensioners are bailed out by taxes on a "transition generation", this generation will experience a sizeable income loss and a related reduction in the return on their forced saving, while subsequent generations will experience higher income and an increased return on their pension saving -as compared to the alternative of retaining a PAYGO system. The transition generation would also be exposed to higher marginal taxes, resulting in lower economic efficiency of work. Subsequent generations would instead be able to enjoy smaller marginal tax wedges and hence increased work efficiency.
An alternative reform strategy would be to bail out PAYGO pensioners entirely by means of government bonds that are never amortized. This will considerably mitigate the income loss and the rise in the marginal tax wedge for the transition generation, while simultaneously limiting the gains for subsequent generations. Moreover, the larger the extent to which the transition is financed by bond issues rather than taxes on a transition generation, the less will national saving increase during the period of transition. Thus, there is a trade-off between ambitions to limit the deterioration of work incentives for a transition generation and to promote national saving in the near future.
Indeed, it is easy to show that the capital value of the gross income gain of shifting to a fully funded system is the same as the implicit debt to the PAYGO pensioners, provided all income streams are discounted by the market interest rate (Feldstein, 1995; Sinn, 1999; Lindbeck and Persson, 2000) . All this means that the issue of shifting to an actuarially fair, fully funded pension system is largely a problem of 21 intergenerational distribution of income (wealth), and of work incentives and of aggregate saving. There is more to it than this, however. In a world of uncertainty, we also have to look at the risk-return combination of alternative pension systems. The returns on PAYGO pension claims are not fully correlated with the return on the claims in the context of actuarially fair pension systems. First, the growth rate of the tax base of a PAYGO system (i.e., aggregate earnings) and the return on financial markets are not fully correlated, in particular, when pension funds have foreign assets.
The political risk is also likely to differ because claims on funded systems with individual accounts probably provide stronger property rights than do pension claims in PAYGO systems. Moreover, in a fully funded system with individual accounts, the individual also seems to be able to enjoy a return on equities in excess of what is required as compensation for risk -an extra return related to the celebrated "equity premium puzzle".
What all these points boil down to is that a combination of a PAYGO and a fully funded system provides a richer portfolio of "assets" than either of these pension systems in isolation. This seems to be the main rationale for a partial shift to a fully funded system. Of course, a complementary rationale could be to redistribute wealth to future generations at the expense of a transition generation, via higher taxes and increased national saving for a while -if our social preferences tell us that this would be distributionally fair.
The most problematic aspect of a (partial or total) shift to a compulsory ,actuarially fair, fully funded pension system is, in my view, how to minimize the risks that such a reform will in fact result in pronounced politicization of the domestic economy. There is a serious risk that future politicians will use government-controlled pension funds to allocate financial funds to those parts of the country where it is particularly important to buy votes. Politicians might also start using the voting rights in firms, based on share holdings, to exert influence within firms. It is naive to think that authorities can create government-controlled pension funds, i.e., nationalize a large part of share ownership, without a severe risk that some politicians -sooner or later -will use these funds to buy votes or to exert direct power over firms, or both. The only reliable way of mitigating these risks is to ensure that pension funds are privately owned and operated from the outset, and hence to allow individuals to choose fund managers. 22 The higher administrative costs of decentralized as opposed to centralized fund management is a small price to pay for limiting the risk of politicization of the national economy. There are also devices to limit the administrative costs of decentralized management of compulsory pension funds (such as caps on fees, which would incuce fund managers to choose index funds).
B. Adjustment to increased heterogeneity
Real-world pension systems have always, at least to some extent, granted the heterogeneity of the population. An obvious example is overcompensation of early cohorts when PAYGO systems were introduced (to bring about a rapid increase in the living standard of the elderly and/or to create broad political support for the reform).
Another example is redistribution in favor of low-income groups via a basic (lumpsum) pension or a guaranteed pension with means-tests on pension benefits. In most earnings-based pension systems in the real world (when pensions are tied to earnings during a limited number of years of work), females are also favored because of fewer years of work and a larger number of years after retirement. But there are also wellknown regressive redistributional elements in most real-world pension systems, although it is difficult to say whether these effects are intentional or not. One example is redistributions in favor of individuals with a steep income profile over their life cycle (when the pension level is tied to earnings late in the individual's working life).
Another example is redistributions to individuals with high expected longevity. In both cases, the arrangements tend to favor highly educated individuals with relatively high lifetime income (wealth).
In recent decades, it is only natural that new types of heterogeneity in the population have given rise to proposals for pension reforms. An obvious example is increased instability of family structure. Pension systems established in the early 20 th century were careful to provide support for widows and their children, since death of the (usually male) income provider used to be a dominating factor behind the breakup of families. The strong trend toward labor-force participation of married women has reduced the need for special pension claims for widows. forms of cohabitation than marriage should be treated.
Increased heterogeneity is also reflected in higher international mobility of labor, would be obligated to reserve a certain minimum balance in their accounts for old age.
Thus, proposals of this type may be seen as efforts to encourage individuals to take greater responsibility for their own income protection in the event of moderate strain on their economic situation. Of course, when having to deal with major income losses, the system of drawing rights has to be combined with insurance; this point is also granted in most proposals. Another basic idea behind the scheme of drawing rights is to provide the individual with increased resources to shift between work, education and leisure over the life cycle. Work incentives would also be improved (via smaller tax wedges) and problems of moral hazard mitigated -two major problems of today's social insurance systems (evidenced by unemployment, sick insurance and early retirement).
As in the case of pension claims in quasi-actuarial and fully actuarial pension systems, it would be easy to allow the individual to keep his saving account and related drawing rights when moving among countries. Thus, compulsory saving accounts with individual drawing rights emerge an interesting response to greater heterogeneity among individuals ("individualization") in an increasingly internationalized labor market, as well as to increased ambitions to encourage individual responsibility.
V. Concluding remarks
As we have seen, the distributional consequences of socioeconomic changes and their effects on macroeconomic balance depend crucially on the detailed ("fine") structure of the pension system and on the exact nature of these changes. 12 It is clear that several problems of current PAYGO systems can be solved within the framework of the systems themselves. For instance, problems concerning financial viability and unexpected redistribution may be mitigated by ad hoc increases in fees, cuts in benefits (often by way of less favorable price indexation) or increased retirement age.
At by shifting to what has here been called quasi-actuarial systems. In the context of such a system, it is also technically easy to have a flexible retirement age without individuals being able to shift the costs of early retirement upon others. I have also mentioned that compulsory saving accounts with individual drawing rights, combined with compulsory insurance systems, provide an interesting alternative response to increased heterogeneity among individuals and to demands for placing greater responsibility on the individual for his own economic security.
I have emphasized that the negative impact of socioeconomic disturbances on pension systems can be mitigated by a partial shift to an actuarially fair, fully funded pension system because the return on pension claims are not completely correlated among pension systems. Such a partial shift would provide individuals better balanced portfolios of pension claim than either a PAYGO or an actuarially fair system alone.
This is an important point in a world with both different types of markets risks (risk in earnings versus risk in returns on capital markets) and different types of political risks (such as different strength of property rights in different types of pension claims). But a complete replacement of a PAYGO system with an actuarially fair, funded system cannot be motivated in this way. One way to motivate such a move would be to favor future generations at the expense of currently working generations.
The most severe problem inherent in a (partial or complete) shift to a fully funded system lies in finding ways to avoid politicization of the domestic economy. The only
